Verify the app
How anyone can check that the app Telegram opens is exactly the published code.
The encryption only protects you if the app you run is the published code. Inside Telegram, nothing stops whoever runs the bot from pointing it at a different page, so the app is published in a way anyone can check.
How the app is published
- Built in public. A public workflow in
incognitochat/incognitochat.github.io(opens in a new tab) builds one release of the code (opens in a new tab), with no other code in that repository. - Reproducible. The same release always builds into byte-identical files, so anyone can rebuild it and compare.
- Signed in a public log. Every file, and a
manifest.jsonlisting the SHA-256 of each one, is signed with Sigstore (opens in a new tab) by that workflow. The signatures are in a public transparency log that can’t be quietly rewritten. - One address, nothing else on it. The app is served only from
https://incognitochat.github.io, and nothing else is ever served there: a page on the same address could reach the keys on your device. - Locked down. The app loads no third-party code, no analytics, and no code or settings from the server.
Check it yourself
From a checkout of the code (opens in a new tab), with the GitHub CLI logged in:
scripts/verify-site.sh https://incognitochat.github.io incognitochat/incognitochat.github.io --rebuild
It checks that every file served is exactly what the unchanged, reviewed workflow built from a release on main, that the same workflow run deployed it, and that no other site shares the app’s address. With --rebuild it also builds that release itself and compares byte for byte. The details, and what it doesn’t prove, are in Verifying the app (opens in a new tab).
Checked automatically
A scheduled job (opens in a new tab) in this site’s public repository runs the same script against the live app every hour, and once a day also rebuilds the app and compares it byte for byte. The latest results, each with its full log:
Every hour: Passed
What this can’t prove
- What one person was shown inside Telegram. The bot’s owner could point the app at another address, for everyone or for chosen people. A page on another address has none of your keys; to get anywhere it would have to make you set up again, which ends your account loudly on your old device and changes your link.
- What the server runs. The design doesn’t depend on it: a malicious server can drop or delay messages and watch timing, but can’t read them or forge them, because the app checks every key itself. Proving the server’s code is a future step (an attested enclave).